Unitizations and Pooling

Let me begin by first explaining that I am not an attorney, nor am I a landman. I have been involved with several unitizations and poolings, and I have relied heavily on the advice of attorneys and landmen during these procedures. The purpose of this entry is to give an overview of unitizations and poolings, their purpose, pros and cons, and things to consider should you find yourself faced with either.

Basically, the purpose of both unitizations and poolings is to combine individual leases into a single entity for the purpose of development. Pooling is usually associated with drilling a well when the individual lease size is smaller than the required statutory well spacing. For example, if there are several contiguous 10 acre leases and an operator wants to drill a well which requires 40 acres, then the operator will pool four of the smaller leases together to form a 40 acre pool on which to drill. The purpose is to prevent waste since drilling a well on a lease smaller than the expected drainage area would require each adjacent lease owner to drill a competing well to prevent drainage—in this example four wells would need to be drilled instead of one.

In pooling, as described above, the resulting “pool” is not intended to represent the entire reservoir (sometimes a reservoir is unfortunately called a pool). This is where unitization differs from pooling. Typically the purpose of unitization is to combine all the leases in a given reservoir or field for the purpose of enhancing the field’s recovery. This is usually necessary in the cases where a flood (waterflood, steamflood, CO2 flood, etc) will be pushing oil and gas around and may cause hydrocarbons to cross lease lines. It is much more efficient to design and operate a flood without having to worry about keeping lease A’s fluids from crossing over to lease B.

In both cases the most important thing is for everyone to get their fair share of the resulting production. In the case of pooling this is commonly done based on acres contributed—if your 10 acres are pooled into a 40 acre pool, then you get 25% of the pool. This is usually the case because the leases are small and the producing formation probably doesn’t vary much between the leases, and if there hasn’t been any drilling yet there usually isn’t much data available to argue about. This is not always the case however, and you can imagine if your lease is sitting on top of a structure and you are being pooled with down-dip leases you may feel you are entitled to a bigger portion.

Unitizations are usually much more complicated. This is because they are typically much larger, involve several wells, often with different operators, and since they are usually in preparation to flood a reservoir there is much more data available to argue about. Also, when converting a field from primary lease-based production to a unitized enhanced recovery flood often some producing wells will be converted to injection and the associated loss in production will take time to recoup. This means the cash flow being generated will be reduced at the same time capital investments are required to install the flood; which usually increases the anxiety in the room.

Several different parameters are typically used to determine each lease’s equitable share in a unitization. Since the primary purpose is to recover remaining hydrocarbons, the original hydrocarbon pore volume and remaining recoverable hydrocarbons per tract are usually very important parameters, as are the current production rates, usable wells, and sometimes acres and cumulative production are used. The goal is to get all the parties (operators and mineral owners) to agree on one formula that divides up the future production and share of the costs (for the working interests). Usually a lot of negotiating is required and sometimes very creative unitization formulas are the result.

Both pooling and unitizations have their purpose in developing an oil and gas reservoir and both have been used for years as a means to prevent waste and increase recovery. As with most everything there have been abuses and inequities in the past and there will no doubt be more in the future. The most important thing to remember is to be sure to understand what is going on, what your lease allows and what options you have available to you, because these things will be very important to you when you’re sitting in a conference room negotiating for your piece of the pie.
 

What's With All These JVs?

It seems like hardly a week goes by anymore without two large oil and gas companies announcing a new JV. Most of the recent JV announcements involve the development of new, hot shale plays. Chesapeake Energy is certainly one of the leaders in this development concept and has announced several different JVs covering most of the current unconventional shale plays, with some very large partners.

Why the interest in a JV? There are several reasons a JV is attractive to the parties involved on both sides of the deal. From the originator’s (or seller’s) side the JV raises capital, allows for the diversification of development (spreads the risk), and leverages-up the returns on the development investment by virtue of the “promote.” From the partner’s (buyer’s) side the JV is a means to enter a hot new play that has been delineated without having to participate in the “land rush” that always precedes these plays, and provides instant access to experienced personnel thus reducing time on the “learning curve.”

With the various unconventional shale plays that have heated up, from the Eagle Ford to the Bakken to the Marcellus and everything in between, there is a common timeline that begins with companies and promoters secretly buying up leases; this requires a lot of time, effort and money. This lease bonus money is at risk because the play is in its infant stage and the acreage you are leasing up may turn out to be non-productive, or the play itself could fizzle out. Companies like Chesapeake and EOG (and others) have taken these upfront risks along with the time and costs associated with developing the drilling and completion expertise specific to each play, but then face the capital requirements necessary to develop their leases. The capital necessary to develop these plays is staggering with costs ranging from $3-10 million per well (more in some cases). Even with companies this size, drilling 100 $10million wells can put a strain on your cashflow.

The company “selling” the JV usually gets a cash payment upfront that allows them to recoup these out of pocket costs and provides capital to continue their development program. The other aspect of the JV is the “promote” which allows the “seller” to develop the asset at much more favorable terms and with less capital. Some of the recently announced JVs have “promotes” on the order of 60% for 25% (Chesapeake/Total Barnett), or 75% for 45% (Pioneer/Reliance Eagle Ford). This means the “buyer” pays for 60% of the drilling costs in exchange for 25% of the well once completed. This is a huge advantage for the “seller” going forward as it leverages up the return on investment and lowers future capital requirements.

On the other side of the equation is the “buyer” who pays the upfront cash and absorbs the “promote.” Usually the buyer gets some PDP production which helps justify the initial cash payment, and steps into a development program which has been delineated (manageable risk) with a partner who has a proven track record. The return on the future development capital will not be as robust for the “buyer” as a result of the “promote,” but they have not been exposed to the initial risks or costs associated with the exploration aspect of the new play. This reduction in upfront costs and risk, combined with the prospect of rapidly climbing the learning curve and perhaps using the technology elsewhere, justifies absorbing the “promote.”

Based on the recent JV activity level there seems to be a continued appetite for this type deal and I anticipate more announcements in the future.

 

Update:  Another Eagle Ford JV anounced between Abraxas and Blue Stone.
 

Chinese Well Data is Expensive!

The Chinese government recently sentenced an American citizen to eight years for selling data relating to the locations and reserves associated with more than 30,000 Chinese oil and gas wells to IHS. The sentence has provoked demands from US officials for Xue Feng’s immediate release and deportation to the US.

As outrageous as this may sound to Americans accustomed to “freedom of information,” we should look in the mirror before we judge the Chinese too harshly.  Here in the US we can usually purchase this type of information (well locations, production data, well logs, etc.) from companies such as IHS, Tobin, and others, or in many cases get the data for free from state regulatory agencies; but this is not always the case.

 

I was recently involved in an Eminent Domain case which involved a large interstate pipeline company wishing to expand a gas storage facility. In this case the pipeline company was concerned that its storage gas may leak out of the boundaries of the existing facility onto the property of nearby landowners. The pipeline company was exercising its federally backed right to take the mineral rights of these owners so it could expand the storage facility to prevent this potential loss.

 

Despite the fact the pipeline company was taking the property of these citizens, they refused to disclose the locations of their wells, the current and future boundary of the storage facility, and their geologic justification for the expansion. They claimed “national security” as their basis for withholding this information from the citizens being impacted.

 

While the US government hasn’t nationalized its oil industry, these large interstate pipelines and utilities have been granted powers approaching that of a NOC. US oil and gas companies are required by most states to provide this type of information with the knowledge that it will be made publicly available, but these interstate pipeline gas storage facilities can hide behind the federal government (FERC).

 

So, before we start making demands of other countries let’s take a minute to think what the repercussions would be for an employee of this US pipeline company had they sold their “national security” secrets to IHS.

Quantum Resources' Denbury Acquisition

"We think there are a lot of opportunities out there. The shale plays take a lot of capital to drill all those leases…companies generally have to issue equity, structure additional debt, or sell their non-core conventional assets—which are what we want to buy."  -Alan Smith, Quantum Resources

In a recent article on OilandGasInvestor.com Leslie Haines interviews Alan Smith of Quantum Resources Management about the recent $900 million acquisition of Denbury assets.  It sounds like Quantum has a good investment plan targeting conventional assets (instead of the ultra-hot shale plays) in well established producing basins, and focusing their capital on enhancing existing production through infill drilling and waterfloods.  

Its refreshing to hear a company talking about doing business the "old school way"-- buy quality assets in mature basins and focus your efforts (and capital) on developing your assets with low risk drilling and flooding; not to mention the portfolio diversification effect of mixing oil and gas assets in different basins.   In the interview Mr. Smith refers to his business philosophy as "contrarian," but I would call it "good business."